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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Rule 403 provides: 
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of 
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as amended) provides: 
Forgery—"Writing" defined.—(1) A person is 
guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating 
a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any 
writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transferance, publication, or utterance purports 
to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or an unnumbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be 
a copy of an original when no such original 
existed. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if 
the writing is or purports to be: 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or 
more . . . 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RUEBEN ROSS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880650-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-501 (1953 as amended). 
Mr. Ross was convicted as charged in the Information 
after a jury trial held on October 27-28, 1988. The Honorable 
John A. Rokich, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah entered final judgment of conviction on 
October 28, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 9, 1988, Jeanne Hunter requested that Cheryl 
Muhammad, a teller at Check Mart, cash a check made out to 
Ms. Hunter for two hundred dollars (Transcript R. 131, hereinafter 
"T." at 75-6, State's Exhibit S-2). Ms. Hunter endorsed the check 
and placed her thumb print on the back of it at Ms. Muhammad's 
request (T. 76). According to Ms. Muhammad, Mr. Ross appeared at 
the window with Ms. Hunter when she attempted to cash the check 
(T. 76). However, Ms. Hunter presented the check and did most of 
the talking (T. 76, 82, 83-4). Ms. Muhammad asked who had written 
the check, and Ms. Hunter responded that her grandmother had given 
it to her (T. 77f 82). Apparently, Mr. Ross had also answered 
simultaneously, stating that the check was from "our grandmother" 
(T. 78). This was the only statement made by Mr. Ross (T. 83). 
Ms. Hunter, who was initially charged with forgery along 
with Mr. Ross, testified that she met Mr. Ross in front of a 
7-Eleven store for the first time on the afternoon on which the 
incident occurred (T. 13). Shortly after meeting Mr. Ross, she 
claimed that she agreed to drive him to the liquor store across town 
(T. 13-14). 
Ms. Hunter's son, who had been in the 7-Eleven store, 
returned and immediately left with Mr. Ross to search for some of 
Mr. Ross1 belongings which had been taken while he talked to 
Ms. Hunter. The trio reunited, then drove to the store and various 
other places. 
According to Ms. Hunter, while they were driving around, 
Mr. Ross told her he would give her some gas money if she would help 
him cash one of his grandmother's checks (T. 19). She agreed and 
took him to her house so he could use the telephone to call his 
grandmother (T, 19-21). Ms. Hunter then drove Mr. Ross to his 
grandmother's house (T. 21). She claimed that Mr. Ross went inside 
the house while she and her son stayed in the car (T. 22-3). 
Mr. Ross returned about five to ten minutes later with a check made 
out to Ms. Hunter (T. 22-3). 
According to Ms. Hunter, the trio then drove to 
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Check Mart, where Ms. Hunter presented the check to Ms. Muhammad 
(T. 31). They waited several minutes and were then arrested 
(T. 31). During her testimony, Ms. Hunter stated: 
MS. HUNTER: When they took my son and my son saw 
them put handcuffs on me and they took him to the 
detention center, I was extremely angry. I felt 
so stupid and so . . . so stupid for trying to 
help him. I just did. I just can't believe that 
he would just let me take my son there, just let 
me take my son there like that. Rueben, why did 
you do that? 
(T. 34). Defense counsel asked that the witness be admonished. The 
witness apologized and started to cry (T. 34). The prosecutor then 
stated: "I was going to say the State has no further questions at 
this time, your Honor. Ms. Hunter has recently had a death in her 
family and I wonder if we could have a recess." (T. 34). 
Mr. Ross testified in his defense. He stated that he had 
talked with Ms. Hunter in passing prior to the day in question 
(T. 163). On the date of the incident, Ms. Hunter agreed to take 
him to Super Sonic Car Wash to pick up his paycheck (T. 164). 
Mr. Ross denied that he had asked her to take him to the liquor 
store (T. 166). 
Mr. Ross further testified that after spending about 
twenty minutes looking for Mr. Ross1 missing bag, Ms. Hunter, her 
son and Mr. Ross got in the car and did various errands (T. 166) and 
that Mr. Ross gave Ms. Hunter three or four dollars for gas (T. 167). 
After doing some errands, the trio went to Ms. Hunter's 
house and Ms. Hunter and Mr. Ross talked while Ms. Hunter's son went 
into the bedroom with their great dane dog (T. 167). They stayed at 
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Ms. Hunter's house for thirty or forty minutes, during which she 
made several phone calls (T. 167). Ms. Hunter told Mr. Ross that 
she was out of work and did not have much money (T. 167). 
According to Mr. Ross, Ms. Hunter wanted to cash a check, 
so the three left her house and went to the home of Mr. Ross' mother 
(T. 168). 
Ms. Hunter was pressuring Mr. Ross to help her cash a 
check. He took her to his mother's house with the hope that his 
mother would help them cash the check (T. 170-71). When Mrs. Ross 
could not help, they decided to try Check Mart. 
At Check Mart, Ms. Hunter presented the check to 
Ms. Muhammad (T. 173). Ms. Hunter did most of the talking (T. 174), 
and Ms. Muhammad did not talk to Mr. Ross (T. 175). Shortly 
thereafter, the police arrived. When they entered the store, 
Mr. Ross was not concerned because he had not done anything wrong 
(T. 175-6). He had been there fifteen to twenty minutes at that 
time (T. 176). 
Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion to suppress 
Mr. Ross' prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983) (R. 24). After a hearing held on October 3, 1988, 
the trial court ordered that the State could use Mr. Ross1 
conviction for Attempted Forgery for impeachment purposes 
(Transcript R. 130, hereinafter "T.H.," at 10). 
The jury convicted Mr. Ross of Forgery, a second degree 
felony, as charged in the Information. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in ruling 
that Mr. Ross1 prior conviction for Attempted Forgery was admissible 
for impeachment purposes in the instant case. Because of the 
attempt qualification, it is unclear from the face of the charge 
what steps were actually taken in the prior case. Since no evidence 
was taken at the trial court level to determine whether this was a 
crime of dishonesty or false statement, the Attempted Forgery prior 
conviction was not admissible under 609(a)(2). Furthemore, applying 
the applicable balancing test under 609(a)(1) establishes that the 
prior conviction was also not admissible under that subsection. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the conviction was admissible under 
609(a)(2) / Rule 403 nevertheless precludes use of the conviction due 
to the overwhelming prejudicial effect caused by the similarity 
between the prior conviction and the crime charged. 
The prosecutor's inadmissible statement to the jury that 
Ms. Hunter was crying because she had recently had a death in her 
family evoked overwhelming sympathy for the State's primary witness 
and unnecessarily inflamed the jury. 
There was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 
for Forgery in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
SUPPRESS MR. ROSS1 PRIOR CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
FORGERY. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion to suppress 
Mr. Ross1 prior convictions (R. 24). After argument, the trial 
judge ruled that Mr. Ross1 prior conviction for Attempted Forgery 
was admissible for impeachment purposes (T.H. 130 at 7-9, 10; 
R. 37-38). 
A. THE CONVICTION WAS NOT ADISSIBLE UNDER RULE 
609(a), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
In reaching his decision, the trial judge did not clarify 
whether the conviction was admissible pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 
of Rule 609(a).! By allowing the use of Mr. Ross' prior conviction 
for Attempted Forgery, the trial court committed reversible error. 
Rule 609(a) provides: 
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
The meaning of the term "dishonesty or false statement" 
1 During oral argument, the State pointed out that the 
only conviction it would use for impeachment purposes would be 
Mr. Ross1 1983 conviction for Attempted Forgery. The Court ruled 
that such conviction was admissible (R. 130 at 10). In his written 
order, the judge ordered that Mr. Ross' two convictions for Forgery 
were admissible (R. 37). In order to minimize the impact of such 
information, defense counsel brought out such conviction on direct 
examination (T. 163). 
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under 609(a)(2) and the question of which crimes constitute 
dishonesty or false statement under that section have been raised in 
several cases before this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, See 
State v, Bruce, Case No. 860325; State v. Lanier, Case No. 880101; 
State v. Johnson, 870096; State v. Brown, 870504-CA. The argument 
presented in such cases is that crimes of "dishonesty or false 
statement" within the meaning of subsection (2) are limited to 
crimes where there is deceit or fraud involved. The legislative 
history of Rule 609(a)(2) indicates that in passing the rule, 
Congress intended to limit crimes of "dishonesty or false statement" 
to those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not 
tell the truth. See United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court determined that robbery is not necessarily a crime "of 
dishonesty or false statement for purposes of 609(a)(2) 
admissibility." JTd. at 18. This Court determined that "under 
609(a)(2) inquiry may be made, at the court's discretion, regarding 
the particular facts involved to determine if honesty was a 
factor." _ld. The Court went on to say that if dishonesty or false 
statement were involved, then evidence of the prior conviction is 
admissible under 609(a)(2). However, if inquiry into the facts is 
not made or does not establish that the crime involved acts of 
dishonesty or false statement, the trial court must apply 609(a)(1) 
in determining whether the prior conviction is admissible. Id. 
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In the instant case, Mr. Ross1 conviction for Attempted 
Forgery is not necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false 
statement. While forgery itself arguably involves some sort of 
fraudulent conduct, the attempt classification on that crime makes 
it unclear as to whether any sort of fraudulent conduct occurred. 
The aspect of a forgery which makes it fraudulent is the actual 
signing of another person's name or representing a document to be 
something that it is not. In an attempted forgery case, the steps 
taken by the defendant which would make the crime an attempt but not 
a completed transaction would not necessarily include the signing of 
a check or otherwise acting in a deceitful manner. Hence, the 
attempt classification of this crime requires further inquiry 
pursuant to Wight for it to be admissible under 609(a)(2). 
Since inquiry into the facts of Mr. Ross1 prior 
conviction was not made, 609(a)(1) is the applicable provision for 
determining whether the conviction was admissible. In State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
the "[f]actors to be considered when balancing probative value 
against prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1).'1 j^ d. at 
1334. Those factors are: 
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing 
on the character for veracity of the witness; 
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the 
prior conviction . . . ; 
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to 
the charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance 
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad 
person; 
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[4] The importance of credibility issues 
in determining the truth in a prosecution tried 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . . ; 
[5] The importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of 
convictions probative of the accused's character 
for veracity . . . . 
Id. The State "has the burden of persuading the Court that the 
probative value of admitting convictions, as far as shedding light 
on the defendant's credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect on 
the defendant." Id. In Banner, the Court held that the trial judge 
committed reversible error in denying Mr. Banner's motion to 
suppress convictions for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape. 
In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court applied the factors set forth in Banner and held that 
the trial court committed reversible error in denying the 
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress convictions for Rape and 
Escape. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor "offered no evidence 
that introduction of the convictions was more probative than 
prejudicial." ^d. at 1334.2 instead, the prosecutor stated "the 
only conviction that the State would plan on using for impeachment 
purposes at trial would be the 1983 conviction for Attempted 
Forgery. I have a case—" (R. 30 at 10). The trial court then 
stated, "I think I will let that one in." See Addendum A for entire 
transcript of argument and ruling regarding the admissibility of 
2
 This is identical to the situation in Banner where the 
prosecutor offered no such evidence. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 
1334. 
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Mr. Ross1 prior convictions. 
An application of the five factors set forth in Banner 
and Gentry establishes that Mr. Ross' prior conviction for Attempted 
Forgery should not have been admitted under 609(a)(1). 
Firstf although a conviction for Forgery arguably has 
more bearing on the character for veracity than a conviction for 
Rape or some other crimes, in the present case where the conviction 
was for Attempted Forgery and the Court did not inquire into the 
facts, it is impossible to ascertain what occurred in the prior 
case. Because of this, the weight to be given the prior conviction 
cannot be established. Under such circumstances, the weight given 
the nature of the crime should not be in favor of inclusion. 
However, even if this Court determines that the nature of an 
Attempted Forgery is such that it has a bearing on the character for 
veracity of the accused, the weight in favor of inclusion should be 
minimal due to the attempt qualification and the failure to inquire 
into the facts. 
Second, the conviction from 1983 was five years old. 
Banner and Gentry suggest that cases eight or nine years old are 
sufficiently remote that the age should weigh against inclusion. A 
conviction which is five years old is not particularly recent or 
remote and therefore does not add weight to the State's argument for 
admission. 
Third, the Attempted Forgery conviction is identical to 
the crime charged except for the attempt qualification. A jury 
which was not given further information about the prior conviction 
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could easily conclude that it was an identical situation. This 
weighs in favor of exclusion of the Attempted Forgery conviction 
since the "close resemblance may leave the jury to punish the 
accused as a bad person." Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. In both Banner 
and Gentry, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the similarity 
between the prior conviction and the crime charged is a significant 
factor weighing in favor of exclusion since such similarity is 
"highly likely to prejudice jurors and unduly influence their 
conclusion regarding defendant's guilt." Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037. 
In State v. Banner, the Court acknowledged that where the 
prior convictions are similar to those charged, the probative value 
of such convictions will rarely outweigh the prejudicial effect. 
Banner at 1334, n.44. In Banner, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated: 
Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial 
effect is especially pertinent when the witness is 
the defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . . 
This is particularly important when, as here, the 
prior conviction is for the same type of crime 
involved in the matter under present 
consideration. In this type of situation, the 
probative value of the evidence as affecting the 
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the 
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and 
the prejudice to the party. 
Banner at 1334, n.44 (quoting Terry v. Z .CM. I. , 605 P.2d 314, 325 
(Utah 1979)). The similarity between the Attempted Forgery and the 
crime of Forgery charged in the instant case weighs very strongly 
against admission of the Attempted Forgery conviction. 
Fourth, in the instant case, the physical evidence 
consisted of the check made out to Ms. Hunter and Ms. Hunter's 
signature and thumb print on the back of the check. The testimony 
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of Ms. Muhammad established that Ms. Hunter did most of the talking 
and was the person who actually presented the check (T. 75, 11, 
82-84). While the State may argue that under such circumstances, 
credibility issues were important to this case and required that the 
State be able to impeach Mr. Ross, such an argument would ignore the 
fact that Ms. Hunter had a prior conviction which the defense was 
not permitted to use (R. 37). Under such circumstances, allowing 
the State to rely on the importance of credibility issues in order 
to tip the balance in favor of inclusion would be fundamentally 
unfair. 
Finally, Mr. Ross' testimony was of extreme importance in 
this case. The primary evidence against him consisted of the 
testimony of Ms. Hunter, the person who actually presented the 
check, endorsed it, and put her thumb print on it. Because she 
claimed that he was responsible for all of her actions, it was 
necessary that he be able to testify. Under such circumstances, the 
fifth factor weighs against inclusion. 
Given the State's burden under 609(a)(1) and the 
overwhelming prejudicial effect of the similarity of the prior 
crime, along with the fact that one of Ms. Hunter's prior 
convictions was suppressed, the State failed to sustain its burden 
of establishing that the probative value of the prior conviction 
outweighed the prejudicial effect. Although the record is unclear 
as to whether the trial judge admitted the prior conviction under 
subsection (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2), this failure to establish 
that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the 
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prior conviction shows that admission under 609(a)(1) was improper. 
Hence, the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Ross1 prior conviction 
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609. 
B. EVEN IF MR. ROSS1 PRIOR CONVICTION WAS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER 609(a)(2), RULE 403 PRECLUDES ITS 
USE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
Even if Mr. Ross1 prior conviction were considered a 
crime of "dishonesty or false statement" under Rule 609(a)(2), it 
nevertheless should have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). Rule 403 provides: 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 403 is a flexible rule which provides the trial judge with 
discretion to exclude a defendant's prior conviction where the 
result of admitting the conviction would be to unduly prejudice the 
defendant. Because of the overwhelming prejudicial effect of 
evidence that a defendant has previously been convicted of a crime, 
Rule 403 is necessary to insure that the proceedings are fair and 
the jury's decision is based on the truth and not on its belief that 
the defendant is a "bad person" or has a criminal propensity. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the 
overwhelming prejudicial effect of prior convictions of a defendant 
and has, in several contexts, limited the ability of the State to 
- 13 -
place information regarding those convictions in front of the jury. 
See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740-1 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372-3 (Utah 1988); State v. James, 767 P.2d 
549, 556-7 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-8 (Utah 
1988) (Justice Zimmerman concurring). 
It is well established in this state that the use of 
prior conviction evidence must be carefully scrutinized since such 
evidence can have a prejudicial effect to the defendant in two 
areas: First, the jury may believe that the defendant has a 
criminal propensity and therefore probably committed the crime with 
which he is presently charged, and, second, the jury may decide that 
the defendant is a bad person who should be punished for his prior 
acts. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). When the prior conviction which the State seeks to use is 
similar or identical to the crime charged, the prejudicial effect to 
the defendant is overwhelming. 
In the present case, where Mr. Ross' prior conviction was 
for Attempted Forgery, the similarity between that conviction and 
the crime of Forgery which was charged emphasizes the need for a 
determination under Rule 403. 
Rule 102, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), adds support to 
the notion that even if a conviction is considered a crime of 
dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2), the trial court must nevertheless 
apply the Rule 403 balancing test. Rule 102 provides: 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness 
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable 
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that 
_ 1 A _ 
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined. 
Utah has not dealt directly with the issue of whether it 
is appropriate to apply Rule 403 after a determination that a prior 
conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2). However, this Court as 
well as the Utah Supreme Court has determined that it is appropriate 
to apply Rule 403 after a determination that evidence of prior bad 
acts is admissible under Rule 404(b). See State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1985); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1989). Given the purpose of the Rules of Evidence and case law in 
this state recognizing the overwhelming prejudicial impact of prior 
conviction evidence, an application of Rule 403 after a 
determination that a prior conviction is otherwise admissible under 
609(a)(2) is appropriate. 
The standard employed under Rule 403 is different from 
that set forth under Rule 609(a)(1). Under 609(a)(1), the State 
must persuade the trial judge that the probative value outweighs the 
prejudicial effect. However, under Rule 403, the balance is 
reversed; the evidence will be excluded only if its probative value 
is outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Hence, the test under Rule 
403 is more stringent than that under 609(a)(1) and would require 
exclusion in less cases. Nevertheless, it would provide an 
opportunity for the trial judge to exclude a prior conviction which 
is otherwise admissible under 609(a)(2) where admitting that 
conviction would taint the entire proceedings and interfere with the 
ascertainment of truth and the just determination of the issues. 
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The distinction between subsection (a)(1) and subsection 
(a)(2) of Rule 609 remains even if Rule 403 is applied. Subsection 
(a)(1) involves felonies only. Under that subsection, it would be 
much easier for a defendant to have the prior conviction excluded 
than it would be under Rule 403. Subsection (a)(2) involves 
misdemeanors as well as felonies where the crime involved dishonesty 
or false statement. Furthermore, due to the more stringent standard 
under Rule 403, such "crimes of dishonesty or false statement" would 
only be excluded where they were so extremely prejudicial that they 
substantially outweighed any probative value that existed. 
Most of the federal circuits have either not addressed 
the issue presented in this case under the federal rules or have 
specifically left that issue open. While the circuits that have 
addressed the issue have determined that Rule 403 is not applicable 
where a prior conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2)/ those 
decisions are not dispositive. 
In United States v.Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980), a 
divided court relied on the federal legislative history to reach its 
decision that Rule 403 is not applicable where a prior conviction is 
otherwise admissible under 609(a)(2). The Toney Court pointed out 
that "[r]ule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of a prior criminal 
conviction for a crimen falsi offense shall be admitted to attack a 
witness1 credibility during cross-examination. When discussing Rule 
609(a)(2), Congress made this clear: 
The admission of prior convictions involving 
dishonesty and false statement is not within the 
discretion of the court. Such convictions are 
peculiarly probative of credibility and, under 
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this rule, are always to be admitted. Thus, 
judicial discretion granted with respect to the 
admissibility of other prior convictions is not 
applicable to those involving dishonesty or false 
statement." 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in 
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. Min. News, pp. 7098, 7103." Toney, 615 F.2d 
at 279. 
The Toney Courtfs interpretation of the quoted passage is 
erroneous. The passage itself, with the term nunder this rule," 
refers specifically to Rule 609. The last sentence of the quote 
specifically discusses the grant of judicial discretion under Rule 
609(a)(1) and in no way refers to Rule 403. The Toney Court's 
conclusion that this passage supports the proposition that Rule 403 
is not applicable where a conviction is otherwise admissible under 
Rule 609(a)(2) goes far beyond what was actually said. 
Furthermore, the Toney Court's conclusion fails to 
consider the legislative history in its entirety. As this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged, Rule 609 was extensively 
debated. According to at least one commentator, few comments made 
during the debate on Rule 609 "went unchallenged." See 50 
U.Cinn.L.Rev. 380, 390 (1981), "The Interaction of Rule 609(a)(2) 
and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Can Evidence of a Prior 
Conviction Which Falls Within the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) Be 
Excluded by Rule 403?" That commentator points out that during the 
debate in the House, Representative Lott (R. Miss.) stated: 
A concern expressed by those endorsing the 
Committee version of the Rule is that permitting 
evidence of all prior felony convictions would 
have a deterrent effect upon defendants with 
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criminal records who wish to testify in their own 
behalf. In the interest of justice, however, a 
jury is entitled to any evidence bearing on a 
testifying defendant's tendency to tell the 
truth. In a case where there is an unusual danger 
that the admission of the evidence of the prior 
convictions would unfairly prejudice the defendant 
on the merits of the case, a remedy is provided by 
the general provision of Rule 401 [sic], which 
states . . . [Rule 403 was then read]. 
120 Cong. Rec. 2381 (1974)." .Id. at 391. This suggests that the 
House believed that 403 would be applicable even if a prior 
conviction were admissible under 609(a)(2). 
The same commentator also points out that the Conference 
Committee Report suggests "that Congress intended courts to have the 
general discretion of Rule 403 to exclude evidence of a Rule 
609(a)(2) conviction if the probative value of the prior conviction 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial 
effect" (Ld. at 391) and cited the very same passage cited by the 
Toney Court in support of that proposition. Hence, the Toney 
Court's reliance on the legislative history of Rule 609 to support 
its holding is erroneous. 
In his dissent in Toney, Judge Tuttle pointed out that 
"application of Rule 403 of the federal Rules of Evidence to Rule 
609(a) will [not] necessarily contravene the intent of Congress to 
treat these two types of convictions differently." Toney, 615 F.2d 
at 283. He further pointed out that Rule 403 "expresses recognition 
that evidence which is relevant, probative and admissible under 
other rules, may nonetheless be so prejudicial that it should be 
excluded." id. at 283. He concluded that "the probative value of a 
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conviction involving dishonesty is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, when the prior 
conviction concerns the same kind of offense for that which the 
defendant is being tried. A judge should not be prohibited from 
excluding this evidence by a rigid holding that Rule 403 can never 
be applied to Rule 609(a)(2)." 16. at 284. 
In United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 
1981), the Court relied on Toney and the same portion of legislative 
history relied on in that case to reach its decision. See also 
United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1983) (relying on 
United States v. Kiendra and same erroneous interpretation of 
legislative history). 
Because of the misinterpretation of the federal 
legislative history, the cases which have reached this issue and 
found that 403 is not applicable are not persuasive. 
In order to insure the fairness of a trial and in light 
of the overwhelming prejudicial impact which prior convictions can 
have, it is necessary that a trial judge be able to exclude a prior 
conviction under Rule 403 if it meets that test for exclusion even 
though the conviction would otherwise be admissible under 
609(a)(2). In the present case, where Mr. Ross1 prior conviction 
was almost identical to that with which he was charged, the 
overwhelming prejudicial impact of that conviction substantially 
outweighed any probative value it might have as to his credibility. 
The jury likely learned of the conviction and reasoned that since he 
had committed such a crime before, he committed the crime in this 
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case. 
The trial judge erred in allowing the use of Mr. Ross1 
prior conviction for impeachment purposes and, as a result, the 
conviction should be overturned and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT TO THE JURY 
REGARDING THE EMOTIONAL CONDITION OF THE STATE'S 
PRIMARY WITNESS CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Jeanne Hunter was the principal witness in the State's 
case against Mr. Ross. According to Cheryl Muhammad, Ms. Hunter 
presented for cashing the check which gave rise to the criminal 
charges in this case (T. 75-6). Ms. Hunter signed the back of the 
check and placed her thumb print on it (T. 76). According to 
Ms. Muhammad, Ms. Hunter claimed that the check came from her 
grandmother (T. 77-8). 
During Ms. Hunter's testimony, she claimed that she had 
just met Mr. Ross and did not know anything about the forgery. She 
stated that as a result of her arrest in the instant case, her 
eleven-year-old son had been taken to a detention center (T. 33). 
Ms. Hunter stated, "I can't believe that he [Mr. Ross] would just 
let me take my son there, just let me take my son there like that" 
(T. 33-4). She then turned to Mr. Ross and asked, "Rueben, why did 
you do that?" (T. 34). 
Defense counsel interceded, asking that the witness be 
admonished (T. 34). The witness apologized and began to cry 
(T. 34). Thereafter, the prosecutor compounded the inflammatory 
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nature of Ms. Hunter's statements and actions by stating that 
"Ms. Hunter has recently had a death in her family" (T. 34). In so 
doing, the prosecutor committed prejudicial error. 
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the applicable test for determining whether 
statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument are so 
objectionable as to require reversal. That test is (1) "Did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict?" and 
(2) "Were they, under the circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks?" j[(3. at 426. 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court again embraced the Valdez test and explained that 
"[s]tep two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the 
circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of 
defendant's guilt." J^ d. at 486. In Troy, the Court went on to 
explain that where "proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial" 
[citation omitted], but "in a case with less compelling proof, [the] 
court will more closely scrutinize the conduct." Id. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor's statement that 
Ms. Hunter had recently suffered a death in the family is not 
relevant and served only to invoke the sympathy of the jurors. 
Although the information was not emphasized in closing arguments, it 
had a greater impact because it was presented to the jurors as if it 
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were an accepted fact, without giving Mr. Ross the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness. The prosecutor had an obligation to not 
only present her case but also to insure that her tactics not 
unnecessarily inflame the jury. The comment by the prosecutor in 
the instant case fit within the first prong of the Valdez test in 
that it offered information to the jurors which they were not 
justified in considering in determining their verdict. 
The second prong of the Valdez test was also met in the 
instant case. As outlined in Point III, there was very little 
evidence in this case which would support a conviction of Mr. Ross. 
What evidence did exist came from Ms. Hunter. Ms. Hunter was 
initially charged in this case and the charges subsequently 
dropped. As an active participant in presenting the check to the 
cashier, her testimony that Mr. Ross was the only responsible person 
was highly suspect. This case essentially involved a question for 
the jury as to which witness was more believable: Ms. Hunter or 
Mr. Ross. Under such circumstances, the sympathy for Ms. Hunter 
evoked by the prosecutor's statement tipped the balance in favor of 
Ms. Hunter. 
This Court should review this issue since it was "plain 
error," even though defense counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor's statement at the time it was made. In State v. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused 
to address the prosecutional misconduct issue due to defense 
counsel's failure to object; however, the Shickles Court did not 
discuss whether the misconduct constituted "plain error" and, 
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therefore, apparently did not believe that it was plain error 
requiring reversal. 
In State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Feb. 1, 
1989), Justice Zimmerman discussed the concept of plain error which 
is embodied in Utah Rules of Evidence 103(d) (1983). That rule 
states: "Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought 
to the attention of the court." 
Two requirements must be met for a finding of plain 
error: (1) That the error was plain or "should have been obvious to 
a trial court" [citations omitted] and (2) that the error had a 
substantial impact on the verdict. Id. at 18-19. 
In the instant case, the erroneous nature of the 
prosecutor's comment should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Such a spontaneous comment from a prosecutor about matters which are 
not relevant to the proceedings should never be made in front of the 
jury. 
Furthermore, this statement had a substantial impact on 
the verdict. Mr. Ross1 testimony indicated that Ms. Hunter was the 
perpetrator of the forgery in this case. He testified that he was 
in the store to buy a soda and knew nothing about the transaction. 
Mr. Ross' testimony was more consistent with that of the teller than 
was that of Ms. Hunter; yet, the jury had to believe Ms. Hunter's 
testimony in order to find Mr. Ross guilty. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should review the 
misconduct in this case and reverse Mr. Ross1 conviction and remand 
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the case for a new trial. 
POINT III. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO 
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR FORGERY. 
Despite the presumption in favor of a jury's verdict, 
this Court nevertheless has the ability to review a verdict to 
determine whether sufficient evidence existed. The Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stated: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (1983); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161 (1980); State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985). This Court has followed 
the same standard for reviewing cases for sufficiency of the 
evidence. State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987). 
This standard restates the due process requirement which prohibits a 
criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which the defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
In order to sustain a conviction for Forgery, the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element contained in Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as amended). That section provides in 
pertinent part: 
76-6-5Q1. Forgery—"Writing" defined.—(1) A 
person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, 
he: 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that 
the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, 
transferance, publication, or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time 
or place or in a numbered sequence other 
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy 
of an original when no such original 
existed. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if 
the writing is or purports to be: 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or 
more . . . 
In the present case, the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive and 
so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross committed the crime for which he 
was convicted. 
The evidence that Ms. Hunter presented the check to 
Ms. Muhammad for cashing and that the check was made out to 
Ms. Hunter and endorsed by Ms* Hunter is uncontroverted. According 
to Ms. Muhammad, Ms. Hunter presented the check and did most of the 
talking (T. 76, 82, 83-4). The only statement made by Mr. Ross was 
a simultaneous response to Ms. Muhammad's question as to who had 
given Ms. Hunter the check (T. 77, 78, 83). Ms. Muhammad did not 
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otherwise talk to Mr. Ross, and he did not otherwise participate in 
the transaction. 
In light of the testimony of Ms. Muhammad that Ms. Hunter 
was the principal participant in attempting to cash the check, the 
testimony of Ms. Hunter was critical to the State's case. That 
testimony is so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross committed the 
forgery. 
Ms. Hunter had met Mr. Ross only that afternoon. 
Nevertheless, according to her testimony, she was willing to drive 
him to the liquor store and help him find his missing belongings. 
In addition, shortly after meeting him, she was willing to accept a 
check made out to her for a significant amount of money and attempt 
to cash it even though she had not met the person whom she 
supposedly believed had written the check. Furthermore, Ms. Hunter 
fabricated answers for the clerk and otherwise acted as if she had 
been involved in obtaining the check which was made out to her. 
Mr. Ross1 testimony regarding the transaction at 
Check Mart was substantially the same as that of the teller whereas 
Ms. Hunter's testimony was not. Mr. Ross testified that he believed 
it was Ms. Hunter's check and that he was simply trying to help her 
get it cashed. His actions in waiting around the store for fifteen 
to twenty minutes and in not responding when the police officers 
arrived indicated that he did not have an awareness that the check 
might be forged. 
In light of the inherently improbable testimony of 
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Ms. Hunter and the actions or lack of action by Mr. Ross, there was 
insufficient evidence in this case to convict him of a forgery. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal as 
the result of insufficient evidence or, in the alternative, for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this yo jjay^ of April, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 MS. REMAL: OUR NEXT MOTION HAS TO DO WITH 
2 DEALING WITH MR. ROSS'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS, AND I HAVE 
3 GIVEN YOU A STACK OF CASES THAT DEAL WITH THAT. THERE 
4 IS THE BANNER CASE, UTAH SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL 
5 CASES THAT DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEFT 
6 RELATED TYPES OF OFFENSES ARE CRIMES OF DISHONESTY 
7 UNDER OUR RULE AND I THINK IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT OUR 
8 RULE IS FASHIONED VERBATIM AFTER THE FEDERAL RULE AND 
9 FOR THAT REASON WE HAVE FEDERAL CASES THAT WE HAVE 
10 GIVEN YOU. STATE VERSUS MOREHOUSE SAYS, IN 
11 PARTICULAR THE DISSENTS BY JUSTICE JACKSON OR JUDGE 
12 JACKSON INDICATE THAT IN HIS OPINION THESE TYPE OF 
13 OFFENSES ARE NOT CRIMES OF DISHONESTY UNDER THE 
14 PROVISIONS OF OUR STATUTE WHICH IS EXACTLY THE SAME AS 
15 THE FEDERAL STATUTE. 
16 I THINK THAT IS QUITE CLEAR FROM UNITED 
17 STATES VERSUS SMITH CASE, ALSO A FEDERAL CASE. I THINK 
18 IT'S ABOUT TEN YEARS OLD. THERE'S QUITE A BIT OF 
19 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND THE RULE AND THE PASSING OF 
20 THE RULE BY CONGRESS AND IT INDICATES ON PAGE 362 THAT 
21 BY THE PHRASE "DISHONESTY AND FALSE STATEMENT" THEY'RE 
22 MEANING AN OFFENSE IN THE NATURE OF WHAT THEY CALL 
23 CRIMES OF CRIMEN FALSI; OTHER WORDS HAVING AN ELEMENT 
24 OF DECEIT, UNTRUTHFULNESS, OR FALSIFICATION BEARING ON 
25 THE ACCUSED'S PROPENSITY TO TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY. 
1 AND IN THIS CASE THEY FOUND THAT, IN FACT, 
2 ROBBERY FOR INSTANCE WAS NOT SUCH AN OFFENSE AND DID 
3 NOT QUALIFY AS A CRIME OF DISHONEST OR FALSE 
4 STATEMENT. U. S. VERSUS SEAMSTER CASE FOLLOWED 
5 THAT SAME REASONING AND FOUND IN FACT BURGLARY WAS NOT 
6 A CRIME OF DISHONESTY. U S. VERSUS GLENN CASE FOUND 
7 BURGLARY AND GRAND THEFT WERE NOT CRIMES OF DISHONESTY 
8 UNDER THAT REASONING, AND AGAIN IN STATE VERSUS 
9 MOREHOUSE THE MAJORITY DON'T — JUSTICE JACKSON SAID 
10 THESE OPINIONS ARE WELL FOUNDED AND THOSE TYPES OF 
11 OFFENSES DO SOMETIMES NOT QUALIFY AS CRIMES OF 
12 DISHONESTY 
13 THE KINDS OF OFFENSES WE HAVE HERE ARE, IN 
14 FACT, CRIMES INVOLVING THEFT-TYPE OFFENSES. WE HAVE 
15 IN 1983 AN ATTEMPTED FORGEY CONVICTION, IN 1978 A 
16 BURGLARY CONVICTION, IN 1983 ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF 
17 A DANGEROUS WEAPON CONVICTION, AND A CLASS A THEFT BY 
18 EXTORTION IN 1986. 
19 IT IS MY POSITION THAT NONE OF THOSE, BASED 
20 ON THE --. 
21 THE COURT: 1983, WOULDN'T THAT — . 
22 MS. REMAL: EXCUSE ME. 
23 THE COURT: THE ONE COMMITTED IN 1983, THE 
24 ATTEMPTED FORGEY — 
25 MS. REMAL: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT 
1 BECAUSE, NUMBER ONE, I HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANY 
2 CASES THAT DEALT STRICTLY WITH FORGEY — 
3 THE COURT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT'S SIMILAR TO 
4 WHAT WE'RE DOING HERE, FORGEY BY DECEPTION. I DON'T 
5 HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
6 MS. REMAL: I THINK THE ONLY QUESTION I WOULD 
7 HAVE IS WHETHER OR NOT, BECAUSE IT WAS ATTEMPTED FORGEY, 
8 THERE MIGHT BE A DIFFERENCE. 
9 THE COURT: WAS HE CONVICTED OF THAT, OR DID 
10 HE PLEAD, OR WAS HE CONVICTED BY A JURY? 
11 MS. REMAL: IT WAS A PLEA. 
12 THE COURT: A PLEA. SO THEY PROBABLY REDUCED 
13 IT. 
14 MS. REMAL: THAT MAY BE, BUT I THINK 
15 REALISTICALLY WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH WHAT THE CONVICTION 
16 IS. 
17 THE COURT: IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THAT ONE 
18 COULD BE ADMITTED. THE 78, I HAVE — WELL, THAT ONE IS 
19 TEN YEARS OLD SO THAT ONE IS TOO REMOTE, EVEN THOUGH 
20 ON THE NEXT ONE A FULL TEN YEARS HASN'T YET ELAPSED AND 
21 THE OTHER WAS A CLASS A. 
22 MS. REMAL: CLASS A BY EXTORTION AND ATTEMPTED 
23 POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
24 THE COURT: DANGEROUS WEAPON, I'M NOT 
25 SO SURE THAT WOULDN'T BE MORE PREJUDICIAL. 
1 MS. BYRNE: YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD SIMPLIFY 
2 THIS. THE 1986 EXTORTION CASE IS THE ONE THAT WE WERE 
3 DISCUSSING EARLIER WHERE MISS GOODFELLOW WAS INVOLVED. 
4 THAT WOULD BE THE PRIOR BAD ACT THAT THE STATE WOULD 
5 SEEK TO HAVE RECEIVED, ADDUCED. THE ONLY CONVICTION 
6 THAT THE STATE WOULD PLAN ON USING FOR IMPEACHMENT 
7 PURPOSES AT TRIAL WOULD BE THE 1983 CONVICTION FOR 
8 ATTEMPTED FORGEY. I HAVE A CASE 
9 THE COURT: I THINK I WILL LET THAT ONE IN. 
10 MS. BYRNE: THAT WOULD BE THE ONLY ONE 
11 THAT WE WOULD — 
12 THE COURT: THE REST OF THEM WON'T COME IN. 
13 WON'T LET THE REST OF THEM COME IN. 
14 MS. REMAL: AS I INDICATED, I THINK A 
15 DISTINCTION OUGHT TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN FORGEY AND 
16 ATTEMPTED FORGERY. SO, FOR THAT REASON — OUR OTHER 
17 MOTION, YOUR HONOR, WAS A MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND MS. 
18 BYRNE HAS GIVEN ME A RESPONSE TO THAT AMD I THINK WE 
19 HAVE EVERYTHING THAT WE NEED, AND IF I DISCOVER 
20 OTHERWISE I'LL CONTACT HER.I THINK WE WENT THROUGH 
21 THAT. 
22 THE COURT: ALL I HAVE TO RULE UPON IS 
23 WHETHER MISS GOODFELLOW CAN TESTIFY. THAT IS THE ONLY 
24 ISSUE. 
25 IF YOU'RE NOT GOING TO MENTION THE EXTORTION 
